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Background: A range of policy initiatives have addressed inequalities in healthcare and health outcomes. Local
pay-for-performance schemes for primary care have been advocated as means of enhancing clinical ownership of
the quality agenda and better targeting local need compared with national schemes such as the UK Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF). We investigated whether professionals’ experience of a local scheme in one English
National Health Service (NHS) former primary care trust (PCT) differed from that of the national QOF in relation to
the goal of reducing inequalities.
Methods: We conducted retrospective semi-structured interviews with primary care professionals implementing
the scheme and those involved in its development. We purposively sampled practices with varying levels of
population socio-economic deprivation and achievement. Interviews explored perceptions of the scheme and
indicators, likely mechanisms of influence on practice, perceived benefits and harms, and how future schemes could
be improved. We used a framework approach to analysis.
Results: Thirty-eight professionals from 16 general practices and six professionals involved in developing local
indicators participated. Our findings cover four themes: ownership, credibility of the indicators, influences on
behaviour, and exacerbated tensions. We found little evidence that the scheme engendered any distinctive sense
of ownership or experiences different from the national scheme. Although the indicators and their evidence base
were seldom actively questioned, doubts were expressed about their focus on health promotion given that
eventual benefits relied upon patient action and availability of local resources. Whilst practices serving more affluent
populations reported status and patient benefit as motivators for participating in the scheme, those serving more
deprived populations highlighted financial reward. The scheme exacerbated tensions between patient and
professional consultation agendas, general practitioners benefitting directly from incentives and nurses who did
much of the work, and practices serving more and less affluent populations which faced different challenges in
achieving targets.
Conclusions: The contentious nature of pay-for-performance was not necessarily reduced by local adaptation.
Those developing future schemes should consider differential rewards and supportive resources for practices
serving more deprived populations, and employing a wider range of levers to promote professional understanding
and ownership of indicators.
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Evidence is accumulating that the establishment in 2004
of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) as a pay-
for-performance scheme for UK primary care has not ful-
filled all hopes and expectations [1]. Not only is there a
problematic evidence base [2], but its effects appear mixed
[3] with persistent variations in the quality of primary care
[4] and concerns that QOF may have undermined pro-
fessionals’ intrinsic motivation, patient-centeredness, and
continuity of care [3,5-9]. Professionals are reluctant
to engage in quality improvement initiatives perceived
as ineffective or even harmful [10], including pay-for-
performance schemes misaligned with professional values
[1,6,11-13]. The Darzi Review of quality improvement in
the National Health Service (NHS) placed much emphasis
on engaging professionals [14]. At a local level, active
involvement of professionals is presumed essential in pro-
moting ownership, providing that perceived benefits of
change compensate for the effort required [15-17]. At face
value, the establishment of pay-for-performance schemes
with locally negotiated indicators offered advantages over
the national scheme, as means of promoting clinical
ownership by addressing local health priorities and enhan-
cing the effects of incentives [18].
We evaluated a scheme in one former PCT which was
particularly motivated by the need to address inequalities
in healthcare provision and outcomes. The scheme ran
over 2007–11 at a cost of £3 million, and targeted five
health priorities: alcohol; learning disabilities; chlamydia;
obesity; and osteoporosis (Table 1). The selection of pri-
orities, indicators and payment thresholds were nego-
tiated between the PCT and local health care providers,
approved by the Local Medical Committee, and reviewed
and refined over the lifetime of the scheme. Our accom-
panying paper provides more detailed information about
the indicators [19]. We found that gaps in achievement
between practices serving less and more deprived pa-
tients were modest during the first year of the scheme
and closed over time for one and widened for one of
the 16 indicators and possibly two other indicators. In
addition, larger practices and those serving more affluent
areas earned more income per patient than smaller prac-
tices and those serving more deprived areas.
These mixed findings somewhat contrasted with longi-
tudinal analyses of the national QOF which indicated
that initial gaps in achievement between practices in de-
prived and affluent areas these closed over time [20]. It
was disappointing that a local initiative intended to over-
come the disadvantages of the national scheme did not
reduce inequalities as intended.
We undertook a qualitative study, in parallel to our
above quantitative analysis, to explore primary care
professionals’ experience of the local QOF, including per-
ceptions of the scheme and indicators, likely mechanismsof influence on practice, and perceived benefits and
harms. We investigated whether professionals’ experience
of the local QOF did differ from that of the national QOF
in relation to the goal of reducing inequalities.
Methods
Design and setting
We undertook a retrospective semi-structured interview
study within NHS Bradford and Airedale, of its local
pay-for-performance scheme.
Participants
We initially invited managers from all 83 practices to
nominate themselves and other practice staff to partici-
pate in interviews. We then purposively selected prac-
tices according to practice population socio-economic
profiles (deprived or not) and local QOF achievement
(high or low achievement). We then used snowballing to
further recruit participants through asking those inter-
viewed to nominate additional practices or participants.
We also invited six PCT and practice professionals in-
volved in developing the scheme.
Data collection and analysis
Following consent, a social scientist researcher (JH) con-
ducted face-to-face interviews at venues of participants’
choice (usually at work) over August 2011 to June 2012.
We reimbursed participants for their time and advised
them that responses would be treated confidentially. In-
terviews explored whether perceptions of the indicators,
mechanisms by which it influenced practice, benefits
and harms, and how future iterations of such schemes
could be improved (Topic guide, Table 2).
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Transcripts were anonymised and checked for accuracy.
We used NVivo 8 to manage interview data and a the-
matic framework approach to analysis [21]. Five tran-
scripts were double coded by (JH, LG and RF) and a
coding schedule was developed (Table 3). JH coded the
remainder of the transcripts. Data were initially coded
deductively to areas pre-specified in the topic guide; fur-
ther codes emerged from the data inductively. Codes
were grouped to form overarching themes which were
iteratively refined over the course of analysis. Recruit-
ment and interviews continued until no new codes had
emerged. We compared and contrasted accounts from
high and low deprivation and high and low achieving
practices, and sought discrepant accounts.
Ethical review
The study was approved by National Research Ethics
Service East Midlands- Nottingham 2 Committee (11/
EM/0184).
Table 1 Indicators for the local pay-for-performance scheme
Domain Indicator Description Number of points
Alcohol A1 The practice can produce a register of patient aged 16 years and
over with a record of the number of units of alcohol consumed
on a weekly basis in the past 27 months
10
A2 Patients who drink equal or greater than 14 units a week for
females and 21 units a week for males in a 7 day cycle with a
period of at least 2 days abstinence are offered a brief intervention
10
Chlamydia C1 The practice can produce a register of patients aged 15 to 24 of
both sexes
2
C2 Patients between 15–24 years old who have been offered
screening by their practice and have a recorded test result
£5 for every screen recorded
Learning Disabilities LD1 The practice can produce a register of people over 18 with LD £50 per registered patient
LD2 The % of patients with LD with a review recorded in the
preceding 15 months. Checks include accuracy of prescribed
medication, physical health and co-ordination with secondary care
£50 for every health check completed
Weight Management OB1 Production of a register of patients between 16–75 with a BMI
equal of greater than 25 recorded in the last 5 years
3
OB2 Production of a register of patients between 16–75 with a BMI
equal of greater than 25 recorded in the last 15 months
7
OB3 Patients with a BMI equal or greater than 25 receive appropriate
intervention in the past 15 months
20
Osteoporosis OST1 Production of a register of female patients aged 65–74 with a
fracture in the previous 15 months
2
OST2 Female patients 65–74 that have had a fracture are referred for a
BMD scan
4
OST3 The practice can produce a register of male and female patients
aged 16–74 years who have received at least one repeat
prescription for oral prednisolone in the previous 6 months
2
OST4 The % of patients on register (OST 3) who have a record of a DXA
scan being performed at any time or a referral for a DXA scan in
the previous 15 months
5
OST5 The percentage of patients on register (OST 4) who have a record
of a DXA scan being performed at any time, or a referral for a DXA
scan in the previous 15 months, or have been assessed for
osteoporosis risk
2
OST6 The practice can produce a register of male and female patients
aged 75 years and over who have had a fragility fracture of the
vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday
2
OST7 The percentage of male and female patients aged 75 years and
over who have had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist,
or humerus since their 75th Birthday, who have been assessed and
treated for Osteoporosis risk ever
5
Hackett et al. BMC Family Practice 2014, 15:168 Page 3 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/15/168Results
We interviewed 44 professionals involved in developing or
implementing the local scheme. Primary care staff from
16 practices participated in the interviews, eight of these
practices having been identified through snowballing.
Eight practices served relatively socio-economically de-
prived populations and 12 had relatively high local QOF
achievement (Table 4). Of the 38 practice staff inter-
viewed, there were 15 practice managers, 10 GP partners,
two salaried GPs, and 11 practice nurses. The six add-
itional participants who had been involved in developing
the scheme comprised four PCT managers, one salaried
GP, and one practice nurse. Thirty-three participants werefemale and 24 worked full-time. Median interview length
was 44 minutes (range 18 to 88 minutes).
We report our findings in four overarching themes:
credibility of the locally negotiated indicators; owner-
ship; influences on behaviour; and exacerbated tensions.
Where evident, we compare and contrast findings
according to participants’ practice population socio-
economic status and achievement, and involvement in
scheme development.
Credibility of the indicators
The local scheme developers had sought to target locally
relevant and, largely, public health issues absent from
Table 2 Topic guide
Section Types of questions/prompts
Background What is your professional background?
How many years have you been qualified?
How many sessions do you work in a usual week?
How would you describe your role in the practice?
General What has your involvement been in developing the local QOF?
What has your involvement been in implementing the local QOF within your practice?
Your opinions




Fairness of indicators Distribution of workload
Scope for gaming
Implications for tackling inequalities
Acceptability of targets Compare to national targets
How does the local scheme work?
How does the scheme influence what you do? Ownership of change/engagement
Motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic)
Social comparison, performance management and surveillance
Organisational means employed to achieve targets
Consequences Effect on practice staff and consultations
- Benefits and unintended consequences
Effect on patients and patient care
- Benefits and unintended consequences
Change required to achieve targets
Are you still maintaining these targets even though the scheme has ended?
How could local QOF be modified and/or improved? How it should be introduced
How implemented on a day to day basis in the practice
Local versus national benefits and harms?
Anything else that you would like to add?
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evidence base underpinning such indicators as less of an
issue than practical considerations around their imple-
mentation. Hence, the evidence base was often taken at
face value, especially by practice nurses:
‘We appreciate that it is evidence based, obviously
we wouldn’t be been asked to do anything that
wasn’t.’ (P11, practice nurse, high performer,
affluent area).‘I don’t know if I was told about the evidence, we
should say, “What’s the evidence behind this?” but
we’re too busy.’ (P37, practice nurse, high performer,
deprived area).Professionals appeared more preoccupied by their lack
of control in achieving indicator targets, especially if
dependent upon patient cooperation:
‘I can see why the alcohol and obesity were thought of
as important, I get the clinical reason but I’m not sure
that it worked in the real world. People thought we’d
get them in and we’d do this, but the fact is that they
don’t come in and you don’t capture them and so it
doesn’t work.’ (P19, practice manager, high performer,
affluent area).
Limited availability of appropriate, supportive resources
needed to address such problems further undermined
confidence in these targets.
Table 3 Coding schedule




Iterative refining of deductive and inductive
codes and themes
Final themes
Influences on behaviour: Motivation: Practitioner motivation: Influences on
behaviour
Ownership of change Support among practices Patient benefit Financial reward
Motivation (intrinsic and
extrinsic)
Financial reward Patient benefit
Competition with other practices
Social comparison
Organisational means
Relevance: Opinions: Attitudes towards the scheme:
Clinical benefit Clinical value Don’t agree with
localisation
Role of general practice
Local population needs Credibility Lack of knowledge/
interest in evidence
Acceptance/rejection of an
externally defined way of working
Prevalence Faith in the evidence
Fairness:
Distribution of workload Uneven workload






Adjusting role of general
practice














by prevalence in population
Funding improves
credibility
Acceptability: Effect on professionals: Effects of implementing a
local scheme:
Exacerbating tensions
Compare to national QOF Just another income stream Created an uneven
workload





Consequences: Effect on patients: Consultation consequences
Effect on practice staff Adapt consultations Standardised care Target became
routine practice
Effect on consultations:
Adapt templates as aids
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Table 3 Coding schedule (Continued)










Recommendations: Recommendations: Experience of engagement Ownership




LoQOF champion Highlight available external




Extension of NQOF Patient involvement Familiarisation period before
data collection
Conflict with NQOF Bottom up approach
Bottom up approach Based at cluster level
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practice, but there isn’t something with alcohol, and
you wouldn’t refer to the alcohol and drugs services
unless someone’s quite bad.’ (P12, salaried GP, high
performer, affluent area).
There was a range of opinion about relevance to local
need, with the indicators being seen as more salient to
relatively deprived populations.
“It was certainly developed based on looking at
measureable things that were relevant to our
population.’ (P36, GP partner, low performer,






High 5 practices 7 practices
- GP Partner (3) - Practice Manager (8)
- Practice Nurse (2) - GP Partner (5)
- Practice Manager (5) - Practice nurse (8)
- Salaried GP (2)
Low 3 practices 1 practice
- Practice Manager (1) - Practice nurse (1)
- GP Partner (2) - Practice Manager (1)
*In addition, there were six other people interviewed who were involved with
the development of the local scheme: four PCT members, one salaried GP, and
one practice nurse.In contrast, professionals from practices in affluent
areas questioned the value of certain indicators to their
population.
‘The alcohol one for example for us is almost a bit of
a waste of time, because our patients don’t fall into
that category.’ (P11, practice nurse, high performer,
affluent area).
Ownership
No clear sense emerged that the local pay-for-performance
scheme was particularly distinctive and offered anything
over and above the existing national QOF. This was
partly because the scheme actually addressed national
priorities.
‘We know too many people are overweight so in that
sense it was targeted at areas where we had a
particular problem…I’m not aware that we had a
specific problem with osteoporosis in Bradford,
likewise with learning disabilities, I don’t think we’ve
got any more of an issue than other areas. There may
have been other Bradford specific issues that we could
have included which we didn’t…I think most GPs
probably viewed it as just another incentive scheme,
and didn’t really think of it as bespoke.’ (P6, scheme
developer).
Ultimately then, practices tended not to differentiate
between national and local schemes, especially high
performers.
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job, whether it’s a local thing or national, it makes no
difference.’ (P19, practice manager, high performer,
affluent area).
One practice manager in a low performing practice
went further in stating that the national scheme was
more important.
‘We were always aware it (the local scheme) was there
but we didn’t feel it was as important as the (national)
QOF.’ (P39, practice manager, low performer, affluent
area).
Participants implicitly defined ‘local’ in different ways, in-
cluding at the practice, cluster of practices, and PCT levels.
‘I think smaller cluster groups, because generally
you’ll have an area such as ourselves here with about
twelve surgeries where we’ve all got similar problems,
so I think it would have helped if practices were
grouped rather than it being a generic local QOF.’
(P14, practice manager, low performer, deprived area).
There was a further suggestion that ‘buy-in’ might be
greater if the identification of at least a limited number
of priorities were delegated to practice level.
‘From the start you’d be making them own it because
you’d be saying “right, here’s a bit of money, you tell
us how you want to spend it as a practice to improve
quality of your patients”, so you’ve got the ownership
immediately because they’ve come up with the
marker.’ (P10, practice manager, high performer,
affluent area).
Some participants expressed views that initial dissem-
ination was insufficient and a familiarisation period
would have helped embed targeted behaviours.
‘If we’d been told a bit more we might have been
more engaged.’ (P23, practice nurse, high performer,
affluent area).‘If we had time to play about with it and start to
monitor our own performance that would be really
useful.’ (P10, practice manager, high performer,
affluent area).
Influences on behaviour
The scheme seemed to influence adherence to the tar-
gets primarily through motivational means, supported
by other mechanisms. Motivations were extrinsically and
intrinsically driven.Professionals from practices serving both affluent and
deprived populations felt the scheme legitimised their
intrinsic motivation to improve patient outcomes.
‘It’s a massive motivation to know that the patients
out there are getting the care that they need.’ (P39,
practice manager, low performer, affluent area).
Others, particularly practices serving more deprived
populations, appeared to be directly amenable to finan-
cial reward as an extrinsic driver.
‘We’re so hard up at the moment, so desperate for
income wherever we can get it, you can’t afford to
pass up a chance of income, so that’s probably as
much a driver…even if we didn’t necessarily buy in
completely to the clinical benefit, it was worth doing
to try and earn the money because we needed to.’
(P33, practice manager, high performer, deprived area).
However, there were concerns that financial rewards
from the scheme may not have been worth the effort in-
volved in achieving targets and that the scheme did not
directly target most of the people actually doing this
additional work.
‘Yes it’s more money for the practice but the majority
of people in general practice are paid by the practice
and they just see it’s more work for them to do,
certainly our practice staff used to think of it
[Local QOF] as a huge amount of work’ (P4, scheme
developer).
For practice managers and GPs in affluent high-
performing practices, competition and implicit threats to
status also emerged as motivators.
‘It does feel a bit like a competition with other
surgeries, I don’t know how others feel but I wouldn’t
like to come last in our locality.’ (P19, practice
manager, high performer, affluent area).
There were three other ways in which the scheme ap-
peared to influence clinical behaviour. Firstly, several high-
performing practices and one low-performer had adapted
templates provided by the PCT to support processes of care
and recording in consultations. Practitioners from these
practices considered that such prompts had been helpful.
‘Before the patients come in you know that you
have to do these things, so it is a motivation. If the
reminder didn’t come up, you wouldn’t remember to
do those things.’ (P22, GP partner, low performer,
deprived area).
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the scheme felt that it promoted standardised care and
believed that adherence to the indicators had become
routine practice. Consultation templates supported this
setting of new norms within clinical routines.
‘Once we start doing something, it does change your
practice and you carry on. The learning disabilities,
because we saw the value of it we’ve kept the
template, we’re still doing the checks, so I think
because we put in all that initial time and resource,
actually then each year it will get less, so we’re
happy to carry that on. I think where we’ve seen that
there’s clinical benefit, once you start doing it, it
becomes habit.’ (P27, salaried GP, high performer,
affluent area).
Thirdly, the social influence of having a member of
practice staff as the champion for the scheme promoted
engagement.
‘It’s having someone that’s responsible for it, it’s their
baby, they’ve got an interest in it, and they will drive it
through. That’s what you need if you want to achieve
with these things you need a champion, someone who
will champion it for you.’ (P33, practice manager, high
performer, affluent area).
Exacerbated tensions
The scheme exacerbated tensions at three levels: bet-
ween patients and professionals within consultations;
between doctors and nurses within practices; and bet-
ween affluent and deprived population practices within
the PCT.
Perceived pressure to focus on targets and ‘box ticking’
during consultations both undermined professionalism
and alienated patients.
‘A lot of patients know I’m ticking a box and they
shouldn’t feel like that, a patient shouldn’t have to
come to a surgery and then I just say, “Oh can I ask
you this”, “Oh yeah you’re just ticking, ticking that
box.” They shouldn’t feel like that.’ (P40, practice
nurse, low performer, affluent area).
This generated conflict between GP and patient agendas,
which many also recognised as a consequence of the
national QOF.
‘It distracts from the consultation and it can leave you
know feeling a bit confused and perhaps as though
that, the thing that the patient regards as the
problem hasn’t been addressed properly.’ (P6, scheme
developer).There were also concerns about adding more and
more into consultations:
‘The consensus among a lot of the GP’s was that it
moved away from being patient centred to doctor
centred consultations in that we never actually got
round to why the patient really had come to see us if
we spent so much time on QOF. There was a lot of
discussion around running out of time and then
running over, and the impact that that had on the
patient, the practice and then personally. (P29, GP
partner, high performer, affluent area).
The scheme augmented perceptions of unfair distribu-
tions of workloads and remuneration within practices,
particularly between nursing and medical staff. Some
nurses were keen to emphasize that they did not think
that they should receive additional money for doing their
job.
‘We’re paid money to do that anyway, why is it that
there’s extra money given when you’re given a wage
to do it anyway? I don’t know why a carrot should be
dangled to a health professional, personally I find it
immoral.’ (P37, practice nurse, high performer,
deprived area).
However, several nurses were openly critical of the fact
that whilst they did most of the work, it was the GPs
who benefitted financially.
‘I think we feel that we do a lot of work towards the
QOF and we probably feel as though we ought to
recompensed, if we had a bonus that was specifically
because we knew that we’d hit QOF targets. I think
people feel well why should only certain parts of the
team get it when everybody’s worked as hard
towards it?’ (P11, practice nurse, high performer,
affluent area).
Amongst practices serving relatively affluent and
deprived populations, there was an opinion that the
scheme risked widening inequalities between ‘us and
them’ if universally applied, as opposed to focusing
on practices and populations with most scope for
improvement:
‘You’ll always get this top lot that will sign up to
it all, always do it, know how to do it, cause they’re
whizzes. But you’ve always got the laggards at the
bottom. They’re the ones that really need to be doing
the local QOF. It really should have been targeted at
those practices first.’ (P13, practice manager, high
performer, affluent area).
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Contrary to aspirations, this local pay-for-performance
scheme did not engender any distinctive sense of owner-
ship nor avoid any of the conflicts associated with the na-
tional scheme. The indicators were seen as reflecting
national rather than specifically locally-owned priorities;
subsequent to the initiation of this scheme, three out of
the five health priorities had been included in the national
QOF. Although the indicators and their evidence base
were seldom actively questioned, doubts were expressed
about their focus on health promotion given that eventual
benefits relied upon patient action and the availability of
local resources (e.g. for alcohol or weight problems).
Whilst practices serving more affluent populations
focused on status and patient benefit as motivators for
participating in the scheme, those serving more deprived
populations also highlighted financial reward. However,
the scheme appeared to influence behaviour through a
range of mechanisms beyond extrinsic reward such as
standardisation of patient care, practice champions
and computerised prompts. Unintended consequences
included the exacerbation of tensions at three levels:
between patient and professional consultation agendas;
between GPs seen as benefitting directly from incentives
and nurses who did much of the work; and between
practices serving more affluent populations where tar-
gets might be easier to achieve and those serving more
deprived populations.
There has been relatively little evaluation of local pay-
for-performance schemes, which are likely to continue
emerging in various forms [18]. We identified similar
themes to qualitative studies of the national QOF scheme,
including the credibility of incentivised targets, tensions
within consultations, changing professional identity and
roles, and inequities in the workload and remuneration
balance among practice staff [5-9,22-25]. These suggest
that the local scheme was not viewed or experienced dif-
ferently by targeted professionals and, taken with our find-
ings suggesting sparse ownership, casts doubt upon the
notion that such a scheme achieved greater professional
‘buy-in.’ Our findings are therefore consistent with an
evaluation by Kristensen et al. of a national pay-for-
performance initiative which centred on locally negotiated
indicators [26]. This also found a gap between the policy
intention of creating locally-owned indicators and actual
experience of the initiative. Interventions aiming to im-
prove the quality of care are often conceived and imple-
mented based on a hopeful set of assumptions about
professional behaviour and contexts [27]. Like others, we
found that this scheme appeared to operate in a number
of ways, beyond the direct influence of financial incen-
tives [6,22,28]. Hence, the range of explicit and implicit
behaviour change techniques associated with pay-for-
performance schemes, such as social influence andcompetition, underline the need to conceptualise and
evaluate them as complex interventions [29-31]. Again,
the notion of local ownership did not emerge as a strong
additional driver for change in our evaluation.
Our study limitations included the experiences of an
intervention from the one former PCT, the characteris-
tics of participating practices, study participants and
timing, and the risk of social desirability bias. First, this
study took place in one geographical area and studied
one local pay-for-performance scheme, thereby limiting
generalizability to other areas and schemes. Second,
although we sought a range of practice characteristics
for our sample, we found that our participants under-
represented poorer performing practices. This could
have affected the balance of views and experiences, po-
tentially towards an emphasis on positive experiences.
However, we encountered sceptical beliefs across the
range of participants, even amongst scheme developers.
Third, we examined perspectives of both those targeted
by the scheme and its developers, and encountered little
divergence of views. We might have identified more dif-
ferences had we been able to capture the developers’
ideas and expectations during the planning phase of the
scheme. We were unable to identify further information
on how the indicators were ‘evidenced,’ which may have
influenced perceived credibility. Fourth, we were aware
that professionals interviewed might tend to express so-
cially desirable opinions or behaviours. This could have
steered responses either way – towards being seen either
to favour the scheme or critical of the PCT. We em-
phasized the anonymity and confidentiality of study
participation, and the interviews did not aim to judge
professional performance.
Potential indicators require testing for key attributes
such as acceptability and feasibility before they can be
rolled out nationally [32]. Glasziou and colleagues pro-
posed nine criteria to help judge whether incentive
schemes are likely to do more good than harm [33].
Three of these seem particularly relevant viewed through
the lens of health professionals targeted by a local
scheme: whether the desired clinical action improves pa-
tient outcomes; whether benefits clearly outweigh any
unintended harmful effects, and at an acceptable cost;
and whether systems and structures needed for change
are in place.
The Bradford and Airedale scheme’s focus on public
health priorities – in contrast to the national QOF which
largely focuses on clinical monitoring and treatment –
illustrates some of the challenges inherent in fulfilling
these criteria. Some health professionals believed that
the local preventive targets could be cost-effective in the
long-term. Others expressed uncertainty about their ‘real
world’ effects, reflecting wider doubts about their roles
and competencies in promoting health [34-36] and
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herence or supporting resources in the wider commu-
nity. Any perceived benefits may have been outweighed
by unintended knock-on effects on a range of profes-
sional and patient relationships [25].
“Localism” is regularly recycled as a theme in NHS
policy-making [37]. In order to increase clinical auton-
omy and therefore have maximal impact upon patient
care, there are continuing calls for greater professional
involvement in developing pay-for-performance indica-
tors [38]. This is order to increase professional buy-in
with such schemes and ensure that indicators are de-
veloped from within and not imposed from the outside
[26]. Yet it is difficult to get beyond such rhetoric in
practice, particularly in generating and implementing
performance targets which are perceived as locally rele-
vant and owned. Professionals tend to voice opinions
about the need for more involvement in developing tar-
gets and their dissemination. In reality, there are only
so many consultations, working groups or educational
events that they can actually participate in. Furthermore,
local groups are unlikely to have access to similar levels
of resources, such as those possessed by the National
Institute for Care Excellence, to derive robust, evidence-
based indicators. There is a case for further efforts to
ensure that the underlying goals of performance targets
are communicated to targeted professionals and aligned
with professional values, especially as a means of overcom-
ing some of the passive acceptance we found [11,12,22].
There is a growing and increasingly robust evidence base
on interventions to change professional practice for
policy-makers and quality improvement leaders to draw
upon [39].
Pay-for-performance itself has a problematic evidence
base, with a Cochrane Review concluding there is “insuffi-
cient evidence to support or not support the use of finan-
cial incentives to improve the quality of primary health
care” [2]. Given that one of the intentions of such schemes
is often to reduce inequalities in health outcomes, any
future local schemes may need to recognise the greater
difficulties faced by practices serving more deprived popu-
lations [40]. As well as financial reward, suggested as a
stronger motivator in such practices, the achievement of
indicators may also depend upon resources already avail-
able within practices and the wider community. Persua-
sion about patient benefit and social comparison were also
critical levers, or implicit co-interventions. Pay for per-
formance represents an inherently complex intervention
with variable effects according to context, the nature of
the behaviours targeted, and co-interventions, all of which
need to be taken into account in planning and evaluating
such schemes [28,41].
Policy-makers should not under-estimate the difficul-
ties faced in promoting ownership of local pay-for-performance schemes. Incentives alone are often insuffi-
cient to bring about change; significant progress is likely
to depend upon multi-level approaches which launch
and coordinate action across all levels of healthcare sys-
tems (individual, team, organisational and wider system)
[42]. These approaches should draw upon evidence-
based interventions to improve practice [39], tailored to
identified barriers to change. The costs of efforts to
promote engagement with local pay-for-performance
schemes need to be considered against realistic ap-
praisals of their likely effects and alternative strategies.
Conclusion
We found little difference in the experience of a local pay-
for-performance scheme compared to a national scheme.
Together, with the limited evidence of professional owner-
ship, it is hard to argue that it offered distinct advantages
over and above the existing national QOF scheme. Future
developments of similar schemes should study the impact
of differential rewards for practices serving more and less
deprived populations, and consider a wider range of levers
to promote professional understanding and ownership of
indicators.
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